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LOUBOUTIN V. YVES SAINT LAURENT: THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S 
FUNCTIONALITY FAUX PAS 
INTRODUCTION 
“Never use the word ‘cheap.’ Today everybody can look chic in 
inexpensive clothes (the rich buy them too). There is good clothing design on 
every level today. You can be the chicest thing in the world in a T-shirt and 
jeans . . .” 
 — Karl Lagerfeld1 
The world that well-respected fashion designer Karl Lagerfeld speaks of is 
one where fashion is the right and privilege of every individual, regardless of 
his or her socio-economic status.2 Various parts of society work towards 
attaining such a world, even our court system.3 To create a world where 
fashion is not the exclusive right of the affluent, trademark law aspires not only 
to protect markholders, but also to protect their competitors and consumers.4 
As shown in this Note, the key to achieving this goal is to allow designers to 
copy one another and to bar them from monopolizing aspects of their design 
that either are essential to the use of their products or put their competitors at a 
disadvantage by their exclusive use.5 
Recently, however, the Second Circuit deviated from this trend of 
consumer protection and, in Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent 
America Holding, Inc., allowed shoe designer, Christian Louboutin, trademark 
rights in the contrasting red color of the soles of his shoes.6 Subsequently, a 
similar issue arose in the Central District Court of California, when BCBG 
Max Azria, a well-known clothing brand, brought a trademark infringement 
suit against Stretta Moda for manufacturing a dress similar to BCBG’s 
“bandage dress.”7 Had BCBG Max Azria and Stretta Moda not obtained a 
 
 1. Karl Lagerfeld, Karl Lagerfeld’s Fashion Therapy, HARPER’S BAZAAR (Feb. 13, 2009), 
http://www.harpersbazaar.com/magazine/feature-articles/karl-lagerfeld-fashion-therapy-0309. 
 2. Id. 
 3. KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW 
IMITATION SPURS INNOVATION 44 (2012). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 6. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 228 
(2d Cir. 2012). 
 7. Herve Leger Sues Stretta in Trade Dress Lawsuit, FAME APPEAL (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://fameappeal.com/2012/03/herve-leger-sues-stretta-in-trade-dress-lawsuit/. In its defense, 
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consent judgment, the Central District Court of California would have had the 
option either to continue the judicial trend of limiting what fashion designers 
can claim as their trademarks or to adopt the Second Circuit’s rationale and 
allow designers to completely monopolize current fashion trends.8 As this Note 
argues, the Second Circuit in Christian Louboutin addressed this dilemma but 
incorrectly chose to grant fashion designers much more power than they should 
be afforded.9 The BCBG matter, however, acts as a red flag for courts in other 
jurisdictions. It stands as a notice that this power struggle between consumers, 
high-fashion designers, and those who wish to mimic their designs is not 
ephemeral. More importantly, it represents the idea that, in the future, courts 
will have the opportunity to limit the negative effect of the Louboutin decision 
and to restore the balance of trademark law so that consumers and competitors 
are as protected as designers are. 
To fully dissect and understand the issues and the arguments against other 
courts adopting the Second Circuit’s holding, Part II traces the history of the 
functionality doctrine and its role in fashion, and explains the current 
understanding of it. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court’s holding that colors 
may be trademarks in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc. Part IV 
discusses the procedural history of Christian Louboutin and suggests that the 
Second Circuit erred in granting Christian Louboutin trademark rights in its 
shoes’ red soles. Part V explains the rationale for BCBG suing Stretta Moda 
and asserts that, had the parties not obtained a consent judgment, this case 
would have given the Central District Court of California the opportunity to 
reject Louboutin and find that BCBG’s bandage feature was functional. 
Finally, this Note concludes that if courts reject Louboutin when deciding 
similar cases, they will reinforce the Lanham Act’s goals of protecting 
consumers, which in turn will support a vibrant fashion industry. 
THE FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE 
If we look at the recent history of trademark law, it illustrates how pre-
Lanham Act cases created the functionality doctrine; however, post-Lanham 
Act cases first strengthened the doctrine and then muddled it by creating a 
confusing standard. 
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof, used by a person to identify and 
distinguish his or her goods . . . and to indicate the source of the goods . . . .”10 
 
Stretta Moda claimed that the bands of fabric in the “bandage dress” are functional since they are 
used to form a tight-fitting outfit that accentuates the female form. Id. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. See infra Part IV.C. 
 10. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). The Lanham Act evolved from the powers 
given to Congress via the Commerce Clause, which states, “Congress shall have the power to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and the Indian tribes.” U.S. 
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Because of the breadth of this definition, it is possible for brands to claim 
exclusive trademark rights in even the most minute details of its product, 
allowing in-demand brands to charge excessively high prices for its branded 
products.11 The Lanham Act, however, also provides a limit via the 
functionality doctrine, which denies trademark protection to product features 
that are “essential to the use or purpose of the article” or “[affect] the cost or 
quality of the article.”12 Even though the functionality doctrine is part of the 
Lanham Act, it emerged long before the law was enacted.13 
A. The History of the Functionality Doctrine 
The functionality doctrine dates back to the late nineteenth century.14 It 
was during that time that only inherently distinctive words and designs were 
considered trademarks, while other source identifiers like product designs and 
packaging were not protected.15 The nineteenth century plaintiff needed to 
bring a “palming off” claim in order to stop others from using his or her 
product design or feature.16 Such a claim was developed to hold a 
manufacturer or designer liable for imitating a rival’s product to intentionally 
confuse consumers into believing that the product is actually its rival’s.17 The 
successful plaintiff had to prove three things: (1) that the product feature 
acquired distinctiveness; (2) that the defendant copied the feature; and (3) that 
consumers were likely to be confused by the defendant’s use of the feature in 
question.18 
As the volume of palming off claims increased, however, courts realized 
that “overly broad protection of product features could harm, rather than help, 
 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; CRAIG ALLEN NARD ET AL., THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8 
(3d ed. 2011). 
 11. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (holding that the 
language of the Lanham Act was broad enough “to include color within the universe of things 
that can qualify as a trademark” and “almost anything at all that is capable of carrying 
meaning.”). 
 12. Lanham Act §§ 2(e)(5), 43 (a)(1)(3), 14(3) (2006); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., 456 
U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982); Lauren Luhrs, Comment, When in Doubt, Wear Red: Understanding 
Trademark Law’s Functionality Doctrine and Its Application to Single-Color Trademarks in the 
Fashion Industry, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 234 n.38 (2012). 
 13. Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark’s Functionality Doctrine, 56 FLA. 
L. REV. 243, 253 (2004). 
 14. Id. at 253. 
 15. Id. at 256–57. Product design and packaging are referred to as trade dress. CRAIG ALLEN 
NARD ET AL., supra note 10, at 802; Thurmon, supra note 13, at 257 (The courts’ refusal to 
recognize product designs and packages “did not change commercial reality” and the different 
appearances of these designs and packaging “sometimes became distinctive product identifiers.”). 
 16. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 258. 
 17. Id. at 257–58. 
 18. Id. at 258. 
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consumers.”19 Although these claims were helpful in protecting distinctive 
product features, they were also hurting the market by barring competitors 
from using features that were necessary to use the product.20 With little to no 
competition in the market, markholders could charge consumers unreasonably 
high prices.21 The courts noticed that these lawsuits were defeating the purpose 
of trademark and unfair competition law, so they began denying palming off 
claims when using the products’ features was necessary for competitors.22 
Additionally, courts were concerned with the overlapping of trademark and 
unfair competition law with patent law and “did not want to grant perpetual 
patent-like protection under the guise of unfair competition law.”23 
In his article, “The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s Functionality 
Doctrine,” Mark Alan Thurmon discussed cases from the early 1900s that 
reflect the judicial system’s strong reluctance to grant “monopolistic 
protection” to functional, but unpatented, product features via trademark and 
unfair competition law.24 For instance, in Marvel Co. v. Pearl, the Second 
Circuit recognized that the bulbous shape, easy compressibility, and soft 
rubber protecting guard of a syringe were “necessary in making and operation 
of such an instrument.”25 Furthermore, the court stated that “in the absence of 
protection by patent, no person can monopolize or appropriate to the exclusion 
of others elements of mechanical construction which are essential to the 
successful practical operation of a manufacture, or which primarily serve to 
promote its efficiency for the purpose to which it is devoted.”26 The court held 
that the basic configuration of a syringe cannot be monopolized because it has 
a functional purpose and was unpatented.27 
After the Marvel decision, the Eighth Circuit, in Le Mur Co. v. W.G. 
Shelton Co.,28 used a similar rationale to find that the alleged infringer’s use of 
a hair curler’s wrapper that warns its user when it is over heated and the foil 
that seals the hair to the curling rod cannot be considered trespass.29 The 
Eighth Circuit recognized that these features were not patentable for lack of 
novelty and that Le Mur Company, the prior user, could not bar others from 
 
 19. Id. at 259. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 259. 
 23. Id. at 260 (explaining that “early courts seemed most concerned with the patent bargain 
issue when the feature in question was also important to free competition”). 
 24. Id. See also Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) (holding 
that that anything not protected by intellectual property law can be freely copied). 
 25. Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161–62 (2d Cir. 1904). 
 26. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 260 (quoting Marvel Co., 133 F. at 161–62). 
 27. Marvel Co., 133 F. at 161. 
 28. Le Mur Co. v. WG Shelton Co., 32 F.2d 79, 81 (8th Cir. 1929). 
 29. Id. at 81; Thurmon, supra note 13, at 260 n.54. 
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incorporating these features in their hair curlers.30 The court explained that “a 
manufacturer . . . must be admitted to have good right to make and vend any 
unpatented article embodying therein the necessary functional parts so that the 
whole will function.”31 The Eighth Circuit reinforced the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Marvel and held that competitors were free to utilize both the 
wrapper and foil in their hair curlers.32 
The Supreme Court’s concern about the overlapping of patent law and 
unfair competition law, also known as the patent bargain concern, played a 
significant role in recognizing the approach that “trademark protection did not 
extend to the configuration of a product and that there was a public right to 
copy the design of unpatented articles as long as the imitator did not pass off 
his goods as the product of another’s.”33 This recognition was reflected in the 
1896 case Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co.34 Singer 
Manufacturing Company (Singer), maker of sewing machines called 
“Singers,” sued June Manufacturing Company (June) for making and selling 
machines of the same “size, shape, ornamentation, and general external 
appearance as the machines manufactured by [Singer].”35 Because its design 
patents had expired, Singer claimed trade mark rights in both the design of its 
machines and in the name, “Singers.”36 It sought to enjoin June from utilizing 
the design and calling the allegedly infringing machine, the “Improved 
Singer.”37 
The Supreme Court denied Singer injunctive relief, stating, “it is self 
evident that on the expiration of a patent[,] the monopoly created by it ceases 
to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent 
becomes public property.”38 June, therefore, had the right to use Singer’s 
design and to call it the “Improved Singer.”39 The Court, however, stated that 
 
 30. Le Mur Co., 32 F.2d at 81. 
 31. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 260 n.54 (quoting Le Mur Co., 32 F.2d at 81). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Amy B. Cohen, Following the Direction of TrafFix: Trade Dress Law and Functionality 
Revisited, 50 IDEA 593, 602 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 34. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 169 (1896); Cohen, supra note 33, at 
602. See also Thurmon, supra note 13, at 262 n.59. 
 35. Singer Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. at 169; Cohen, supra note 33, at 602. See also Thurmon, 
supra note 13, at 262 n.59. 
 36. Singer Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. at 176; Cohen, supra note 33, at 602. See also Thurmon, 
supra note 13, at 262 n.59. 
 37. Singer Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. at 176. 
 38. Id. at 185; Cohen, supra note 33, at 602. 
 39. Singer Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. at 203. Also, the court determined that Defendant could use 
the name “Singer” because the term had become generic and referred to sewing machines in 
general. Id. at 185–86. See also Thurmon, supra note 13, at 262 n.59. 
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despite having the rights to the design, June was still obligated to inform the 
public that its machines were not manufactured by Singer.40 
Relying on the Singer decision, other pre-Lanham Act courts adopted the 
approach of protecting the public’s right to use unpatented product features 
that were functional.41 For example, in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., the 
Supreme Court allowed Kellogg Company (Kellogg) to use the “pillow-shape” 
design of its shredded wheat and to call it “Shredded Wheat” even though 
National Biscuit Co., also known as Nabisco, was the first to do so.42 Nabisco 
had tried to attain a design patent on the pillow shape design; however, the 
patent was later invalidated because the design had been in the public domain 
for more than two years before the patent application had been submitted.43 
The Court first decided that the name, “Shredded Wheat” was generic 
since the pillow-shaped biscuit was generally known by that name.44 
Additionally, the Court noted that Nabisco did not have the exclusive right to 
sell shredded wheat in the pillow-shaped form because its design functioned as 
an identifier of the product itself rather than the source of the product.45 
Furthermore, the Court stated: 
Where an article may be manufactured by all, a particular manufacturer can no 
more assert exclusive right in a form in which the public has become 
accustomed to see the article and which, in the minds of the public, is primarily 
associated with the article rather than a particular producer, than it can in the 
case of a name with similar connections in the public mind.46 
Coupling this approach with the Singer decision, the Court held that Kellogg 
could utilize both the name and design of the biscuit, but only if it reasonably 
makes known to the public that its product is not Nabisco’s.47 
In light of the Singer decision, courts realized that they needed a “middle 
ground” because placing distinctive or source-identifying features into the 
public domain on grounds of functionality would lead to consumer 
 
 40. Singer Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. at 186 (“But it does not follow, as a consequence of a 
dedication, that the general power vested in the public to make the machine and use the name 
imports that there is no duty imposed on the one using it, to adopt such precautions as will protect 
the property of others and prevent injury to the public interest, if by doing so no substantial 
restriction is imposed on the right of freedom of use.”). See also Cohen, supra note 33, at 602. 
 41. Cohen, supra note 33, at 604. 
 42. Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938); Cohen, supra note 33, at 
604. 
 43. Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 119 n.4. 
 44. Id. at 116. See also Thurmon, supra note 13, at 265 n.78. 
 45. Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 119. See also Thurmon, supra note 13, at 265 n.78; Cohen, 
supra note 33, at 604. 
 46. Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 120. 
 47. Id.; Cohen, supra note 33, at 604. 
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confusion.48 In Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., the Second 
Circuit found that consumer protection was more important than the patent 
bargain concern.49 The court considered numerous potential changes that 
Humphrey Cornell Company (Humphrey Cornell) could make in order to 
ensure that consumers would not mistake its biscuits for Shredded Wheat 
Company’s (Shredded Wheat),50 the first company to make shredded wheat 
biscuits.51 After Shredded Wheat’s design patents on the size and shape of the 
biscuit had expired, Humphrey Cornell made its biscuits in the same shape and 
size.52 Shredded Wheat, however, was able to show secondary meaning to its 
product in that “the public [had] become accustomed to regard its familiar 
wheat biscuits as emanating, if not from it by name, at least from a single, 
though anonymous, maker.”53 
Giving the distinctiveness of the biscuit size and shape a great deal of 
significance, the Second Circuit refused to permit Humphrey Cornell to use 
Shredded Wheat’s functional features without any restrictions.54 It stressed that 
Humphrey Cornell should make “nonfunctional” changes since doing so would 
not leave it at any competitive disadvantages and would simultaneously protect 
consumers from confusion.55 The court recognized, however, that Humphrey 
Cornell could not make any changes in its biscuits’ form, color, or size.56 
Changing the form would not be fair because Shredded Wheat had an expired 
design patent, indicating that the form was functional.57 A color change would 
be over-burdensome because, to change the color, Humphrey Cornell would 
have to bake its biscuits in a way that would ruin the biscuits’ taste.58 Also, 
Humphrey Cornell could not change the size because doing so would not give 
any “effective relief” to Shredded Wheat.59 Still, the Second Circuit found that 
“some mark impressed upon the surface of the biscuit in the baking, or some 
wrapping or tag, with an adequate legend” would be practicable relief.60 To 
 
 48. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 264. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 961 (2d Cir. 1918); 
Thurman, supra note 13, at 264. 
 51. Shredded Wheat, 250 F. at 963. 
 52. Id. at 962. 
 53. Id. at 963. In this opinion, the Second Circuit cited to the Singer opinion and stated the 
rule of law that “[i]f the public has come so to associate the machine with a single maker, he is, 
we think, entitled to some protection, as much when the association be through mere appearances 
as when it be wrapped up in a name . . . .”Id. 
 54. Id. at 964–65; Thurmon, supra note 13, at 264. 
 55. Shredded Wheat, 240 F. 964–65; Thurmon, supra note 13, at 264. 
 56. Shredded Wheat, 250 F. at 964–65; Thurmon, supra note 13, at 264. 
 57. Shredded Wheat, 250 F. at 964. 
 58. Id. at 964–65; Thurmon, supra note 13, at 264. 
 59. Shredded Wheat, 250 F. at 965; Thurmon, supra note 13, at 264. 
 60. Shredded Wheat, 250 F. at 965. 
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ensure that such a solution was practical, the court also concluded that 
Humphrey Cornell could return to court in six months to bar this requirement if 
it made competition with Shredded Wheat impossible.61 Through this opinion, 
the Second Circuit conveyed the message that consumer protection surpasses 
any other concern when it comes to unfair competition, and even the 
functionality doctrine must be used in a way that is consistent with this.62 
Although the functionality doctrine emerged from “palming off” claims to 
protect the market from monopolistic tyranny,63 its birth also brought into 
courts the confusion of balancing its protecting effects with the unwanted 
intermingling with patent law.64 To find a balance, courts transformed the 
functionality shield into a “limited defense,” keeping the focus on the 
defendant’s product, rather than the plaintiff’s product.65 Such was the case in 
Marvel, Singer, and Shredded Wheat, where the courts considered what the 
defendants could do in order to market their products rather than focus on 
whether the plaintiffs’ products were actually functional.66 This common law 
trend, however, disappeared after the enactment of the Lanham Act.67 
B. The Functionality Doctrine Today 
Although many cases like Marvel, Singer, and Shredded Wheat Co. played 
a significant role in structuring the functionality doctrine, the 1946 enactment 
of section 45 of the Lanham Act was by the far the most influential event in the 
history of the functionality doctrine.68 Because of the breadth of section 45’s 
definition of a trademark, product configuration and design now fall into the 
trademark category.69 The common law doctrines are no longer necessary in 
determining whether a functional product feature is protectable because the 
Lanham Act explicitly states that functionality is a basis to refuse registration 
and to cancel a registered trademark.70 Furthermore, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proof to show that, if the mark is not registered, his or her mark is 
 
 61. Id. at 967; Thurmon, supra note 13, at 265. 
 62. Shredded Wheat, 250 F. at 966–67; Thurmon, supra note 13, at 264. 
 63. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 258. 
 64. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 65. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 270. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 251 n.30. 
 68. See generally Cohen, supra note 33. 
 69. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2000) (holding that 
product design can be trademarked if the mark holder can show that the design has acquired 
distinctiveness); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (holding that 
product packaging can qualify as a trademark and can be inherently distinctive). 
 70. Lanham Act §§ 2(e)(3), 14(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1053, 1064 (2006); Trademark Act of 1946, 
Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 14(3), 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
1064(3)(2006)); Cohen, supra note 33, at 605–06.  
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not functional.71 Today, functionality is no longer a “limited defense” that it 
once was in the common law era, and, because of the Lanham Act, the courts 
base their decisions almost solely on the functionality doctrine rather than use 
the balancing tests from previous “palming off” cases.72 
The post-Lanham Act courts have delved further into defining the 
functionality doctrine, bifurcating it into two types: utilitarian functionality and 
aesthetic functionality.73 Utilitarian functionality is defined by the Inwood 
standard, which states that if the product feature is “essential to the use or 
purpose of the article or it affects the cost or quality of the article . . . there is 
no need to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the 
feature.”74 A feature is aesthetically functional when its aesthetic values 
“confe[r] a significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use 
of alternative designs.”75 
Initially, the Supreme Court recognized the Inwood standard as the general 
definition of functionality.76 This standard, however, created problems because 
almost any feature “affects the cost or quality of the product.”77 Many circuit 
courts tried to avoid using the Inwood standard by rendering it dicta and 
choosing to use the competitive need rationale.78 This competitive need 
rationale denies trademark protection to a feature that “would eliminate a 
competitive market for the product on which the trademarked feature 
appears.”79 Finally, the Supreme Court, in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products 
Co., provided a uniform functionality standard by reconciling Inwood with the 
competitive need rationale.80 It held that a product feature, utilitarian or 
aesthetic in nature, is functional and cannot serve as a trademark “if exclusive 
use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.”81 
 
 71. Lanham Act §33(b)(8). 
 72. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 270–71. 
 73. Cohen, supra note 33, at 597. 
 74. Luhrs, supra note 12, at 234 (citing Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, 456 
U.S. 844, 851 n.10 (1982)); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 
(2001). 
 75. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1993)). 
 76. Inwood Laboratories, 456 U.S. at 850 n.10 (“In general terms, a product feature is 
functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of 
the article.”) (emphasis added). 
 77. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 285. 
 78. Id. at 290. 
 79. Luhrs, supra note 12, at 235. 
 80. Id. at 240. 
 81. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995). The Supreme Court 
did not overrule the Inwood standard in Qualitex, but actually used it along with the competitive 
need rationale to create the new standard. Id. 
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Some circuits have implemented an even stricter standard for 
functionality,82 reflecting the idea that the functionality doctrine has grown 
much stronger than it was considered in Shredded Wheat. One of these 
attempts manifested in the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Vornado v. Duracraft, in 
which the court stated that where product configuration is a significant 
inventive component of an invention covered by an expired utility patent, 
patent policy requires it to enter the public domain even if it is nonfunctional.83 
Vornado, a fan manufacturer, had a utility patent on the grills of its fan on 
which they spent a considerable amount of advertising expenses.84 
Subsequently, Duracraft, another fan manufacturer, also incorporated grills 
into its fans without infringing the patent.85 Upset with Duracraft’s success in 
selling its fans, Vornado sued seeking to enjoin Duracraft from using the 
grills.86 The Tenth Circuit sided with Duracraft.87 Because the grills were 
patented, they were, collectively, a “significant inventive element” of 
Vornado’s fans and could not be protected as a trade dress.88 Most circuits, 
however, chose to reject Vornado and decided that protection is not necessarily 
foreclosed just because there is a utility patent for the product.89 
Years later, the Supreme Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
Vornado and, in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., held that 
when an expired patent claims the features in question, the person seeking to 
establish protection has the burden of showing that the feature is not 
functional.90 In this case, Marketing Displays created road signs with a dual 
springs and TrafFix Devices followed with an identical design.91 Marketing 
 
 82. Luhrs, supra note 12, at 239. 
 83. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 
1995); Luhrs, supra note 12, at 239 (“Vornado marked the first time a court adopted a per se rule 
prohibiting trademark protection for features that were part of a patent.”). 
 84. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 58 F.3d at 1500. 
 85. Id. at 1500–01 (noting that both parties agreed that the [Duracraft] Turbo Fan did not 
infringe Vornado’s patents); Thurmon, supra note 13, at 315 n.324. 
 86. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 58 F.3d at. 1501. 
 87. Id. at 1500. 
 88. Id. at. 1510; Luhrs, supra note 12, at 239 (The Vornado decision was “the first time a 
court adopted a per se rule” that denied trademark protection for features that were protected by 
an expired patent.) (citing Thurman, supra note 13, at 316). 
 89. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 316. 
 90. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001). Although the 
TrafFix decision is often cited when discussing this rule, the concept of using an expired patent to 
identify a product feature as functional dates to a much earlier time. Cohen, supra note 33, at 602; 
See In re Application of Oneida Community, 41 App. D.C. 260, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1913) (holding 
that the Commissioner of Patents’ refusal to register, as a trademark for spoons, a “circular or O 
shaped film having distinct edges, on the back of the spoon bowl” was justified since there was an 
expired patent covering this feature). 
 91. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 25–26. 
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Designs used to have a utility patent on the springs, but it had expired.92 The 
Supreme Court first decided that the expired patent created a strong evidentiary 
inference of functionality.93 It then explained that the competitive need 
rationale only applied to aesthetic functionality cases and reinstated the Inwood 
standard.94 Because the expired patent showed the dual spring design was 
essential to the use of the sign, it was presumed to be functional.95 Marketing 
Designs was unable to produce any evidence that showed that the design was 
not functional, which led to the Supreme Court holding in favor of TrafFix.96 
A great deal of controversy stemmed from TrafFix because of the Supreme 
Court’s break from the majority, its allegedly flawed analysis, and its decision 
to provide two different standards for the functionality doctrine.97 Despite the 
fact that the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth Circuits, and the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit had rejected Vornado in that they refused to grant 
automatic protection to features of an invention protected by an expired utility 
patent, the Supreme Court accepted it in TrafFix.98 Several scholars also 
argued that the Supreme Court erred in coming to this decision.99 One of these 
scholars, Mark Alan Thurmon, criticized that: 
the Court never discussed the competition concern or the potential for 
consumer confusion that will result when distinctive product features are 
deemed functional and thus denied trademark protection. Instead, the Court 
myopically focused on the patent question. That was a grave mistake, and it 
led to a series of errors that effectively turned the entire functionality doctrine 
on its head.100 
The “grave mistake” that Thurmon referred to was that the Supreme Court 
began its analysis with the assumption that the evidence of a utility patent is 
heavily weighted; thus, the decision had been made before the analysis.101 
Another major change brought about by the TrafFix decision was that it 
created two different standards for functionality.102 It limited the preferred 
competitive need rationale to aesthetic functionality.103 The utilitarian 
functionality doctrine, however, “reverted to the foggy Inwood standard.”104 
 
 92. Id. at 26. 
 93. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 324 (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 29). 
 94. Id. at 325 (citing TrafFix Devices Inc., 532 U.S. at 29). 
 95. TrafFix Devices Inc., 532 U.S. at 29. 
 96. Id. at 33–35. 
 97. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 325–26. 
 98. Id. at 323. 
 99. Id. at 324–26. 
 100. Id. at 324. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 326. 
 103. Id.; Luhrs, supra note 12, at 240. 
 104. Luhrs, supra note 12, at 240. 
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For these reasons, critics argue that the Supreme Court turned the functionality 
doctrine into a set of “inconsistent and largely incomprehensible standards and 
distinctions.”105 
The functionality doctrine has evolved as a shield that keeps trademark 
owners from asserting rights in parts of their products that are essential to their 
use.106 Upon the enactment of the Lanham Act, this doctrine grew from the 
common law defense to a statutory element of trademark validity.107 The 
Inwood decision, however, was overbroad because it declared functional all 
features that affected the value of the product.108 The majority of courts later 
adopted the Qualitex standard that reflected the competition theory, but the 
Supreme Court disagreed in TrafFix and limited its applicability to only 
aesthetic functionality.109 The current functionality doctrine has been left 
vague, incomprehensible, and controversial.110 
ESTABLISHING COLORS AS TRADEMARKS 
Part II traced the history of the functionality doctrine and explained the 
controversies stemming from its current understanding. This Part explains the 
establishment of single colors as trademarks. In the pre-Lanham Act era, single 
colors were not thought to be sufficiently distinctive to be considered valid 
marks.111 Colors could only be protected if they were incorporated into a 
pattern of other colors, words, or symbols.112 The Lanham Act, however, 
erased most of the restrictions.113 The modern law is that as long as the mark is 
used in commerce, is either inherently distinctive or has acquired 
distinctiveness114 as an indication of source, and is nonfunctional, it may be 
considered a trademark.115 
 
 105. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 326. 
 106. See supra Part II.A. 
 107. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 108. Thurmon, supra note 13, at 285. 
 109. Luhrs, supra note 12, at 240. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Danielle E. Gorman, Note, Protecting Single Color Trademarks in Fashion After 
Louboutin, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369, 374 (2012). 
 112. Id. (citing Stephen J. Newman, Kill the “Mere Color” Rule: Equal Protection for Color 
Under the Lanham Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1595, 1604 (1994)). 
 113. Id. at 373–74. 
 114. See Abercrombie and Fitch, Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(holding that trademarks can be inherently distinctive if they are either: suggestive, arbitrary, or 
fanciful in nature and, if the trademark merely describes the product, it will need secondary 
meaning). 
 115. Lanham Act §45, 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2006); Gorman, supra note 111, at 372–73. 
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Relying on the breadth of the Lanham Act, the Qualitex court explicitly 
removed the ban on single color trademarks.116 Qualitex was a company that 
made green and gold dry-cleaning pads and sued Jacobson Products, another 
company, for using the same color for its pads.117 Qualitex alleged that 
Jacobson Products was a trademark infringer and sought an injunction to stop 
it from continuing the use of the color.118 The United States Supreme Court 
agreed with Qualitex and stated that single colors can be trademarked once 
they have acquired enough distinctiveness so that they signify that the product 
comes from a single source.119 It concluded that “it is the source-distinguishing 
ability of a mark—not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or 
sign—that permits it to serve the basic purposes of a trademark.”120 
The Supreme Court also addressed many of Jacobson’s counterarguments 
that supported the denial of trademark protection to single colors.121 First, 
Jacobson contended that the court’s final decision would lead to shade 
confusion, meaning courts and competitors would be unable to differentiate 
between colors to conclude if there was infringement.122 The Supreme Court, 
however, disagreed, holding instead that the courts face similar problems with 
other non-color marks; thus, allowing color protection would do no additional 
harm.123 Jacobson next argued that allowing single color trademarks would put 
competitors at a disadvantage because exclusive use of a color would lead to 
color depletion.124 The Court rebutted Jacobson’s objection with the theory that 
the functionality doctrine was designed to protect competitors from this 
situation and barring single color trademarks was, therefore, unnecessary.125 
Finally, Jacobson argued that since colors are already protected as overall trade 
dress, it is unnecessary to provide them separate, individual protection.126 This 
argument failed as well because “one can easily find reasons why the law 
might provide trademark protection in addition to trade dress protection.”127 
 
 116. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995); Gorman, supra 
note 111, at 373–74. 
 117. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 161. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 166. 
 120. Id. at 164. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that “sometimes, a color will meet 
ordinary legal trademark requirements. And, when it does so, no special legal rule prevents color 
alone from serving as a trademark.” Id. at 161. 
 121. See Gorman, supra note 111, at 377, 379–80. 
 122. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 167–68. 
 123. Id. at 168; Gorman, supra note 111, at 377. 
 124. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 168. 
 125. Id. at 169. 
 126. Id. at 173. 
 127. Id. at 174. 
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In Qualitex, the Supreme Court solidified the role of single colors as 
trademarks.128 This decision was revolutionary, and numerous companies 
celebrated the chance to finally claim rights to the colors that had brought them 
their success and their clientele.129 The issue of whether the Qualitex decision 
can help a fashion designer attain trademark rights in a color, however, is 
brought into question in Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent 
America Holding, Inc.130 
CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN S.A. V. YVES SAINT LAURENT AMERICA 
HOLDING, INC. 
This Part discusses the District Court’s decision in Christian Louboutin 
and analyzes the Second Circuit’s decision. It also suggests that the Second 
Circuit ignored the need for copying in the fashion industry and that Christian 
Louboutin’s red soles are aesthetically functional. In Christian Louboutin, the 
Second Circuit held that Mr. Christian Louboutin (Louboutin), a French 
footwear designer, had a valid trademark in the contrasting red outsoles of its 
black shoes.131 These black shoes sell from four hundred to six thousand 
dollars per pair and flaunt the Red Sole Mark, the “shiny” red color appearing 
on their soles since 1992.132 Fashion critics consider these shoes to be “the 
most revered shoes around the globe.”133 Intent on making this red colored 
signature exclusively his own, Louboutin registered this hue as a mark with the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office.134 Yves Saint Laurent, another 
famous fashion brand, began marketing red shoes which included red soles.135 
Louboutin sought a preliminary injunction against Yves Saint Laurent, 
claiming trademark infringement.136 Yves Saint Laurent counterclaimed for 
cancellation of the mark’s registration on the basis of aesthetic functionality.137 
 
 128. Gorman, supra note 111, at 376. 
 129. Id. (“Since Qualitex, various companies such as United Parcel Service, 3M, and Tiffany 
& Co. have successfully registered single color marks.”). 
 130. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 211–
12 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 131. Id. at 228. 
 132. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 
447 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 133. Gorman, supra note 111, at 370. The Louboutin shoes are considered extremely popular 
and are often “seen on Hollywood starlets and fashion icons strutting on red carpets and 
runways.” Benjamin Weiser, Shoe Designer Can Protect Its ‘Pop’ of Red, Court Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at A23. 
 134. Christian Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 448. 
 135. Id. at 449. 
 136. Id. at 450. 
 137. Id. at 457. 
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A. The District Court’s Decision 
In the first round of litigation, Yves Saint Laurent prevailed on its motion 
for summary judgment.138 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York found that even though colors may be marks, the use of the red 
color in this case was per se aesthetically functional.139 The lower court stated 
that it was protecting the market from an undue hindrance to competition.140 
Though recognizing that, in Qualitex, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that 
upon acquiring distinctiveness a single color may be a mark, the court found 
that the nature of the fashion industry compelled it to find this matter 
distinguishable.141 According to the judge, the industries in Qualitex were very 
different from the fashion industry in that the latter revolves around “creativity, 
aesthetics, taste, and seasonal change.”142 The use of colors in the fashion 
industry do not only signify the source of the design, but they are used for 
expressive and aesthetic purposes.143 
Approaching the Louboutin matter with the fashion industry distinction in 
mind, the lower court held that the color red was aesthetically functional and 
Louboutin had no right to bar Yves Saint Laurent from using red in its soles.144 
One of the most important facts supporting the court’s decision was that 
Louboutin had conceded that he used red because it was “sexy” and “attracts 
men to the women who wear [his] shoes,” which indicated that the color had a 
functional purpose.145 It follows that Yves Saint Laurent would need to use the 
color for functional purposes as well, such as “to create a monochromatic shoe, 
and to create a cohesive look consisting of color-coordinating shoes and 
garments.”146 If the court were to grant Louboutin trademark rights, not only 
Yves Saint Laurent, but other competitors would be unduly barred from 
“achieving [their] stylistic goals.”147 Because of the functional nature of the 
color red and the harm to competition that would result from ruling in favor of 
Louboutin, the lower court refused to recognize the color as a trademark.148 
 
 138. Id. at 458. 
 139. Id. at 451. 
 140. Christian Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 453. 
 141. Id. at 451, 456. 
 142. Id. 451. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 457. 
 145. Id. at 453. The court stated that “[t]he outsole of a shoe is, almost literally, a pedestrian 
thing. Yet, coated in a bright and unexpected color, the outsole becomes decorative, an object of 
beauty. To attract, to reference, to stand out, to blend in, to beautify, to endow with sex appeal—
all comprise nontrademark functions of color in fashion.” Id. at 454. 
 146. Christian Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 457. 
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Much to Louboutin’s dismay, the district court also stated that it was likely 
that trademark registration of the Red Sole Mark would be cancelled.149 The 
judge was unable to cancel the mark at that time because discovery had not 
formally closed and “Louboutin [was] entitled to certain ‘procedural 
safeguards’ before the court may sua sponte dispose of its claims.”150 The court 
reserved its decision on cancellation to give Louboutin a reasonable amount of 
time to defend his mark and salvage his registration rights.151 
Louboutin appealed to the Second Circuit,152 but the decision to appeal 
was a risky one.153 If Louboutin’s attorneys waited to appeal until after the 
court had invalidated the Red Sole Mark, competitors could have released into 
the market numerous “cheap red-soled shoes.”154 If, however, they appealed 
before the district judge cancelled the mark, they would risk annoying the 
courts, as circuit courts do not “look favorably on challenges of interim 
rulings.”155 After balancing the risks, Louboutin concluded that waiting to 
appeal would do irreparable damage to his business.156 
B. The Second Circuit’s Decision 
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that 
Louboutin had a valid and enforceable trademark because it was the “pop” of 
the red sole that distinguished its creator.157 Yves Saint Laurent, however, was 
still not found to be infringing because its shoes were monochrome and did not 
incorporate the “pop” of the red color, which now exclusively belonged to 
Louboutin.158 The Second Circuit came to this decision via a three-part 
analysis.159 First, it considered whether a single color can act as a trademark in 
the fashion industry.160 Next, it discussed whether a single color mark is 
always functional in the fashion industry.161 Finally, it determined whether the 
Red Sole Mark could be protected as a legitimate trademark.162 
 
 149. Id. at 458. 
 150. Id. at 457–58. 
 151. Id. at 458. 
 152. Scott Flaherty, How They Won It: McCarter Saves Louboutin’s Soles, LAW360 (Oct. 23, 
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As to the question of whether a single color could act as a protectable 
trademark in the fashion industry, the Second Circuit concluded it could.163 It 
first noted that the Qualitex court had held that a single color can act as a mark 
if it acquires secondary meaning in that it “distinguishes a firm’s goods and 
identifies their source, without serving any other significant function.”164 The 
Second Circuit also interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Qualitex to 
prohibit the application of a per se rule that would invalidate single color 
trademarks because they are adopted in a specific industry.165 It found that the 
lower court’s decision to bar single color trademarks in the fashion industry 
was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Qualitex.166 
The Second Circuit next analyzed the aesthetic functionality doctrine and 
determined that not all single color marks are aesthetically functional in the 
fashion context.167 It again relied on Qualitex, and stated that “in determining 
whether a mark has an aesthetic function . . . we take care to ensure that the 
mark’s very success in denoting (and promoting) its source does not itself 
defeat the markholder’s right to protect that mark.”168 The Second Circuit 
deduced that this standard did not grant a competitor the largest range for “his 
[or her] creative outlet,” but only protected him or her from being completely 
excluded from a market.169 This way, consumers would still benefit from the 
competition.170 Using this narrower reading of the doctrine, the Second Circuit 
stated that color marks in the fashion world could be accommodated as 
trademarks as long as they did not hinder competition.171 Rather than applying 
the district court’s per se rule, the Second Circuit required that courts balance 
“‘the competitive benefits of protecting source-identifying aspects’ of a mark 
against the ‘competitive costs of precluding competitors from using the 
feature,’” and found it unnecessary to decide whether the Red Sole Mark was 
functional.172 
The Second Circuit concluded that the Red Sole Mark could serve as a 
valid trademark and that the lower court’s holding that a single color could 
 
 163. Id. at 226. 
 164. Christian Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 218 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. 
Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995)). 
 165. Id. at 223. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 222. “When the aesthetic design of a product is itself the mark for which protection 
is sought, we may also deem the mark functional if giving the markholder the right to use it 
exclusively ‘would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related-disadvantage.’” Id. at 
219–20 (quoting Qaulitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165). 
 169. Id. at 223. 
 170. Christian Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 224. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 222 (citing Fabrication Enter. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
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never be a trademark in the fashion industry was clearly erroneous.173 Pursuant 
to the Qualitex standard, the Red Sole Mark was valid only if it acquired 
secondary meaning.174 After evaluating the district court’s findings regarding 
Loboutin’s advertising expenses, media coverage, and volume of sales, the 
Second Circuit concluded that the Red Sole Mark immediately denoted the 
shoes’ source in the public’s mind.175 This conclusion, however, only extended 
to instances where the red sole “[popped] out” in contrast to the upper black 
part of the shoe because consumers identified Louboutin as the source of the 
shoe when only the sole was red.176 Louboutin, therefore, could not enjoin 
Yves Saint Laurent from selling its monochrome shoe, but it still held valid 
trademark rights in the Red Sole Mark.177 
C. The Second Circuit’s Errors 
The main argument against the Second Circuit’s decision to allow 
Louboutin exclusive right in the Red Sole Mark is that the court ignored the 
importance of copying in the fashion industry. Also, if the Second Circuit 
would have applied its test for aesthetic functionality on the Red Sole Mark, it 
would have correctly concluded that it was a functional, invalid mark. 
1. Copying: The Key to Affordable Fashion and Innovation 
Although Louboutin may assert that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Qualitex requires the Second Circuit to grant it the exclusive right to use the 
Red Sole Mark, fashion is a very different industry where Qualitex should not 
be construed as a bar to copying.178 According to Professors Kal Raustiala and 
Christopher Sprigman, this industry’s uniqueness lies in its reliance on the dual 
pronged function of copying designs.179 First, copying allows for consumers of 
all socio-economic statuses to afford new fashion trends.180 Additionally, it 
gives rise to induced obsolescence of designs, which leads designers to create 
 
 173. Id. at 228. 
 174. Id. at 225–26. “Factors that are relevant in determining secondary meaning include: (1) 
advertising expenditures, (2) consumer studies linking the mark to a source, (3) unsolicited media 
coverage of the product, (4) sales success, (5) attempts to plagiarize the mark, and (6) length and 
exclusivity of the mark’s use.” Id. at 26 (quoting Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 
F.3d 137, 143 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 175. Id. at 226, 228. 
 176. Christian Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 227. The Second Circuit limited its conclusion to only 
the contrast of the Red Sole Mark to the rest of the shoe after finding that “Louboutin’s own 
consumer surveys [showed] that when consumers were shown the YSL monochrome red shoe, of 
those consumers who misidentified the pictured shoes Louboutin-made, nearly every one cited 
the red sole of the shoe, rather than its general red color.” Id. at 228. 
 177. Id. at 228. 
 178. See RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 3, at 35. 
 179. Id. at 44–45. 
 180. Id. at 44. 
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new designs and keeps innovation in the fashion industry alive.181 The Second 
Circuit’s decision to bar copying of the Red Sole Mark will therefore freeze the 
high prices of red soled shoes and inhibit innovation in the shoe industry. 
One of the roles that copying plays in the fashion industry is that it controls 
the prices of new designs so that they are affordable to all.182 The fashion 
world is unlike any other industry because it is driven by clothing, a part of 
people’s daily lives that conveys “socially complex and context-dependent” 
signals about them.183 Coupling the positional nature of clothing with the 
human desire to “buy what others buy,” consumers rush to purchase the newest 
trends sported by a celebrity or a stylish role model.184 Newly launched 
designs, however, often sell at sky-high prices that are impossible for the 
average, middle-class consumer to afford.185 Copying provides this consumer 
the key to indulge in the same high fashion that society’s most elite and 
affluent enjoy.186 Once a new fashion trend is copied, it simultaneously 
becomes more widely purchased and less desirable to those who religiously 
purchase only the newest designs in the market.187 Raustiala and Sprigman 
have labeled this phenomenon as the “piracy paradox.”188 What springs from 
this paradox is price reduction and higher marketing of less expensive versions 
of the design, allowing consumers of even the lower income tiers to enjoy new 
fashion.189 
In addition to cost reduction, copying creates a cycle called induced 
obsolescence, which allows for innovation in the industry to thrive.190 The 
cycle begins with the launch of a new design, which finds its way to the closets 
of the early adopters, who seek to “stand out.”191 Immediately, this design 
catches the eyes of numerous fashion magazines and blogs that “write of it 
glowingly.”192 After noticing the upward trajectory of the design’s success, 
other fashion houses desire to sell the same design to the next tier of buyers 
who seek to flock to the trend.193 Once the design becomes popular among a 
wider range of consumers, however, the early adopters, who deeply value the 
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exclusivity of a design, seek to abandon it.194 After the early adopters “move 
on,” the others, who are “less style focused,” also become bored with this 
design.195 It is at this point that designers must again create new designs and 
funnel them to the early adopters.196 This process is a constant cycle that starts 
with the birth of a design and ends with the demand for another.197 For this 
reason, designers are constantly innovating fashion trends to meet the ends of 
the cycle, which not only keeps creativity alive, but also maintains the life of 
the industry.198 
Because copying plays such an essential role in protecting a wide range of 
customers and the fashion industry itself, the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Louboutin to bar others from copying the Red Sole Mark can be very harmful. 
The Second Circuit has essentially allowed only the affluent early adopters to 
afford shoes that fashion the Red Sole Mark. With all other designers barred 
from incorporating the “pop” of the Red Sole Mark, there will never be 
widespread distribution of cheaper versions of these shoes. This design will 
always remain the exclusive right of those who can afford to spend up to six 
thousand dollars for a pair of shoes, while the rest of the consumers can only 
want to sport one of today’s most stylish trends. 
Additionally, the Second Circuit’s Louboutin holding has also placed a 
great obstacle in the cycle of induced obsolescence, which leads to lesser 
creativity in the fashion industry. Now that the “pop” of the Red Sole Mark 
will not reach the “flockers,” the early adopters who value the exclusivity of 
their red soles have no incentive to “move on” to other shoe designs. The 
desire of the early adopters to “stand out” withstands time, as the craze of the 
trend will likely not fade since “flockers” cannot dilute its popularity. Had the 
Second Circuit considered the unique nature of the fashion industry and its 
reliance on copying, it would have realized that it is harming not only 
consumers, but also the process that helps the fashion industry survive. 
2. The Functional Role of Red 
Even if the “pop” of the Red Sole Mark may be a distinctive source 
identifier, the mark still fails to meet the standards of validity since it is 
aesthetically functional. The Second Circuit stated that courts must use a 
balancing test and weigh the benefits of protecting the source-identifying 
aspects with costs of barring competitors from using the feature, but it dodged 
resolving the issue of whether the Red Sole Mark’s “pop” is aesthetically 
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functional.199 Had the court continued its analysis using this test, it would have 
found that the costs of granting Louboutin trademark rights in the Red Sole 
Mark is extremely high to its competitors because of the importance of red in 
the fashion industry.200 Red has historically been considered “the equivalent of 
couture” and “only the wealthy wore it because its production required 
imported dyestuffs, driving up costs and a lust for it along with it.”201 Today, 
this color is used by women to “get noticed,” to “immediately hearken love, 
lust, and sex,” and to signal passion, romance, and panache.202 As stated 
earlier, The Red Sole Mark is meant to invoke these same emotions.203 Barring 
others from using this mark, therefore, unreasonably burdens competitors since 
they will resort to using colors that do not have the same appeal as the passion-
invoking appearance of the red sole. 
After Christian Louboutin, the Second Circuit left for consumers a market 
where fashion designers’ fears of competition are dwindling, allowing them to 
charge high prices for these designs.204 Moreover, Louboutin’s competitors are 
barred from using an aesthetically functional feature that plays a very 
important role in the fashion industry.205 If adopted in other circuits, the 
Second Circuit’s rationale has the potential to exclude the general public from 
enjoying the benefits of reasonably priced fashion. For this reason, other courts 
should view the resurfacing of this problem as an opportunity to limit the effect 
of the Second Circuit’s decision. One such case that illustrates this opportunity 
is BCBC Max Azria, Inc. v. Stretta Moda, LLC. 
BCBG MAX AZRIA GROUP, INC. V. STRETTA MODA, LLC. 
This Part explains the features of BCBG’s “bandage dress,” discusses why 
BCBG sued Stretta Moda, and asserts that this case, had it gone to trial, would 
have provided the Central District Court of California the opportunity to reject 
the Second Circuit’s rationale in Christian Louboutin and to render the dress 
 
 199. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 200. See Sunila Sreepada, Comment, The New Black: Trademark Protection for Color Marks 
in the Fashion Industry, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1131, 1157 (2009). A 
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 205. See supra Part IV.B. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
540 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII:519 
aesthetically functional.206 In BCBG Max Azria Group, Inc. v. Stretta Moda 
LLC., the issue of whether fashion designers can use trademark law to claim 
specific features of their designs reemerged.207 BCBG is a California 
corporation that owns the “Herve Leger” brand of high fashion apparel, which 
claimed trademark rights in its “bandage dress.”208 The corporation sought an 
injunction against Stretta Moda for selling a dress that embodies many of the 
bandage dress’s features, which, as it claimed, distinguishes the dress from 
those made by other designers.209 
A. The Bandage Dress Debuts 
BCBG claimed that its famous “bandage dress,” the Herve Leger Trade 
Dress, is a “high fashion garment [that contains] the following non-functional 
elements: (a) bands of fabric, (b) arranged in horizontal and/or diagonal 
patterns, (c) to form the tight-fitting dress with an overall look that accentuates 
the female form.”210 According to BCBG’s complaint, the Herve Leger brand 
made continuous and exclusive use of these elements in each of its dresses in 
order to distinguish it from dresses made by other designers.211 To ensure that 
the public immediately identifies the Herve Leger Trade Dress to its brand, 
BCBG spent millions of dollars to specifically promote the signature bandage 
look in several fashion shows, magazines, and advertisements.212 Additionally, 
BCBG purposely marketed these dresses to exclusively specialty boutiques and 
high-end department stores such as Saks Fifth Avenue, Bloomingdales, 
Nordstrom, and Neiman Marcus.213 Having taken such careful marketing steps, 
BCBG turned its Herve Leger Trade Dress into a haute couture garment and 
claimed to have established secondary meaning in consumers’ minds.214 
 
 206. The Central District Court of California is not obligated to follow the Second Circuit’s 
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 209. Id. 
 210. Complaint at 2, BCBG Max Azria Group, Inc. v. Stretta Moda, LLC., No. 2:12-CV-12-
2088-ABC-JCG (C.D. Cal. 2012) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 211. Id. at 2–3. 
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B. The Bandage Dress is Copied 
In November 2010, Stretta Moda was formed.215 Stretta Moda is a line of 
less expensive, lower quality garments, and its bandage dresses are sold to 
retail stores and on its website.216 BCBG alleges that “each Stretta 
garment . . . is either a direct copy of an authentic Herve Leger garment 
embodying the Herve Leger Trade Dress, or is an amalgam of one or more 
Herve Leger garments . . . embodying the Herve Leger Trade Dress.217 
BCBG claimed that it suffered because of Stretta Moda’s use of the 
bandage feature in its dresses.218 First, BCBG stated that the alleged 
infringement caused consumers to be confused about whether BCBG either is 
the actual manufacturer of Stretta Moda’s garments or has licensed it to use the 
bandage feature.219 Also, BCBG stated that the status of the Herve Leger Trade 
Dress as a unique product identifier of the Herve Leger brand deteriorated 
because of Stretta’s alleged infringement.220 Finally, Stretta’s actions allegedly 
caused reputational harm to the Herve Leger brand because the inferior quality 
construction of Stretta’s products led confused consumers to believe that 
BCBG is responsible for the products’ shortcomings.221 
In light of all of the alleged harm claimed, BCBG sued Stretta Moda for 
trade dress dilution, trade dress infringement, and unfair competition.222 BCBG 
moved for the Central District Court of California to enjoin Stretta from 
continuing to infringe the Herve Leger Trade Dress, that Stretta pay BCBG for 
all of the harm it had caused, and that BCBG be awarded three times any 
 
 215. Id. at 4. 
 216. Id. at 4–5. 
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damages that the district court found due.223 Months later, however, the parties 
obtained a consent judgment in favor of BCBG Max Azria.224 
C. The District Court’s Interest in Ignoring Christian Louboutin 
Though the parties obtained a consent judgment, BCBG Max Azria Group, 
Inc. v. Stretta Moda provides an ideal example of how the problems that first 
surfaced in Louboutin are hardly ephemeral.225 Courts that face such cases 
should limit the reach of the Second Circuit’s decision and, instead, should 
provide competitors and consumers the fair chance to create and purchase 
affordable fashion. For example, had BCBG Max Azria Group, Inc. v. Stretta 
Moda gone to trial and appeal, the district court and the Ninth Circuit would 
have had the opportunity to hold that because the fashion industry thrives on 
copying and because the bandage feature is aesthetically functional, BCBG 
cannot have trademark rights in the Herve Leger Trade Dress. Stretta Moda’s 
copying would simultaneously allow a much larger number of consumers to 
afford a form-flattering dress and trigger more innovation among dress 
designers. Recognizing the bandage dress’ functional nature will also preserve 
the healthy competition among dress designers. Once courts begin to 
acknowledge these benefits, they can provide other courts some guidance in 
correctly finding that the Red Sole Mark is functional as well. 
1. The Ability to Copy the Bandage Dress 
Because of the constraining effects that the Louboutin decision brings to 
the fashion industry,226 courts should use cases like BCBG as vehicles to 
prevent these effects from invading other jurisdictions. One way courts can do 
this is by emphasizing that the fashion industry is one where copying is 
essential in making today’s trends available to all kinds of consumers. For 
example, if BCBG had gone to trial, the courts in the Ninth Circuit could refuse 
to adopt Louboutin, reasoning that the decision is not binding and that adopting 
it would require the court to overlook the fact that without Stretta’s alleged 
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“infringement,” only the rich and famous could afford the bandage dress. 
Moreover, the fashion industry thrives on exactly the type of copying in which 
Stretta engaged, and it needs Stretta to make bandage dresses at lower prices so 
that this trend may also pass through the cycle of induced obsolescence. The 
fashion industry is designed to encourage copying so that there remains a 
demand for new trends and innovative creations, and Stretta Moda was 
ensuring exactly that. Although the Second Circuit found the opposite 
conclusion and granted Louboutin rights in the Red Sole Mark, cases like 
BCBG arise as golden opportunities for courts to isolate the Louboutin decision 
to only the Second Circuit rather than expand its application to other 
jurisdictions. 
2. The Aesthetically Functional Role of the Bandage Dress 
Courts can also avoid stretching the negative effects of Louboutin by 
refusing to side-step the aesthetic functionality issue. For instance, if the 
Central District Court of California had gotten the chance to decide BCBG, it 
would have been able to find that the bandage feature is aesthetically 
functional. The costs of keeping competitors from using the bandage feature 
far outweigh the benefits of protecting its source-identifying aspects. 
Consumers flock to the Herve Leger Trade Dress because it flatters the female 
body form and, in its complaint, BCBG conceded that the dual horizontal and 
diagonal arrangement of the bands of fabric is meant to create a flattering and 
slimming look.227 Giving BCBG exclusive trademark rights in the bandage 
feature would then keep competitors from designing dresses that flatter the 
female form. If the BCBG court were to apply the aesthetic functionality test 
correctly, it would find this restriction to be unreasonably burdensome on dress 
designers and would thusly hold that the “bandage dress” is aesthetically 
functional. Such a decision would direct future courts reviewing the Red Sole 
Mark to note that its appearance also plays a functional role in the fashion 
industry and that barring others from using it would be unreasonably 
burdensome. 
CONCLUSION 
Louboutin has not only left designers in constant fear of being sued for 
incorporating fashion trends in their designs, but it has also provided no 
rational solution that other courts can use when deciding similar cases. 
Because of the prevalence of this issue, however, other courts have the power 
to salvage the very essence of the fashion industry. BCBG is an example of 
future cases that will allow other jurisdictions to emphasize the uniqueness of 
the fashion industry by focusing on the fact that copying leads to more 
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affordable fashion designs and increases innovation in the industry.228 If the 
district court in the Ninth Circuit had had the chance to hear BCBG and to take 
the role of copying into consideration, it would have likely held that Stretta 
Moda is not infringing by copying BCBG’s Herve Leger Trade Dress.229 Had 
the Second Circuit done so, it would have found that giving Christian 
Louboutin exclusive rights in the Red Sole Mark would deny the middle-class 
consumer affordable fashion and would hinder the cycle of induced 
obsolescence.230 Furthermore, the BCBG court should have found that when 
balanced with the need to protect any source identifying function BCBG’s 
bandage feature may have, the need to protect the competition is much more 
necessary.231 This conclusion stems from the fact that other competitors would 
be barred from making a dress that flatters the female body form, which is an 
important feature in the fashion industry.232 Such a holding would allow other 
courts to hold that the Red Sole Mark is also aesthetically functional by 
drawing on the similarities between the function of the color red and the 
function of the bandage dress.233 
More importantly, cases like BCBG present courts with the opportunity to 
confirm that intellectual property rights are indeed meant to protect various 
members of society. The public policy behind trademark protection is not to 
reward a markholder with a monopoly; it is to create a balance in the market so 
that the markholder, the consumer, and the competitor are protected.234 
Although, at first glance, it may seem that copying a source-identifying feature 
of a fashion design is an outright violation of trademark law, it should be noted 
that this “violation” protects the consumer and the industry as whole. For this 
reason, the correct holding in BCBG would be that BCBG’s Herve Leger Trade 
Dress cannot be trademarked. Such a decision reinforces the idea that every 
consumer, regardless of his or her socio-economic status, has the right to 
indulge in every form of fashion at an affordable price. Moreover, it can 
reassure members of the fashion industry that they will not be forced into a 
market where the very essentials of fashion design can be monopolized and 
taken away from their palette. Thus, the must-have this season is the refusal to 
adopt the Second Circuit’s fashion faux pas. 
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